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I. 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding, and in the trial court, are: 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN 
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants and 
Appellants 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the State of Utah 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant and 
Appellee 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah1 
Defendant and Counter-Claimant 
(not a party to the appeal) 
1
 Plaintiffs' separate actions against Box Elder and Cache Counties were 
consolidated in the Box Elder action. Plaintiffs' prior application for permission to 
appeal the trial court's decision as to Cache County was dismissed on procedural grounds. 
See Appellate Case No. 20070682-CA. Therefore, this appeal is as to the trial court's 
decision as to Box Elder County only. 
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The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) because it regards an order over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of this matter was transferred to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(4) which allows the Supreme Court to transfer 
to the Court of Appeals certain matters over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. This matter currently lies with the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the Supreme Court's order dated October 1, 2009 which granted Appellants' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Statement of Issues 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman 
Act ("the Ombudsman's Act"), U.C.A. § 13-43-101 etseq.} 
2
 Unless indicated otherwise, all citations to the Ombudsman's Act are to U.C.A. 
(2007) § 13-43-101 et seq. and do not incorporate changes made to the Ombudsman's Act 
during later legislative sessions. The Ombudsman's Act in its entirety is included in this 
brief as Addendum C. 
1 
A. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that arbitrating questions of 
ownership is beyond the scope of the Ombudsman's Act 
B. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the question of 
"ownership" is only peripheral to takings issues . 
C. Does arbitration of this dispute fairly fall within the purview of the 
Ombudsman's Act. 
B. Standard of Review 
Interpretation and application of a statute, such as the Ombudsman's Act, is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.3 Furthermore, the issues of (1) 
whether arbitration is mandatory; or (2) whether a trial court erred in staying arbitration 
are reviewed "for correctness," according no particular deference to a prior court's 
decision."4 
C. Grounds for Seeking Review 
The Ombudsman's Act requires that arbitration under the Act follow the 
procedures and requirements of Title 75B Chapter 11, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act5 
The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act provides that an appeal may be taken from an order 
3
 Department of Natural Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 52 P.3d 
1257, 453 Utah Adv.Rep.6 (Utah 2002). 
4
 McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 980 P.2d 694, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19 (Utah App. 1999). 
5U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(a)(i); Addendum C. 
2 
granting a motion to stay arbitration.6 In this case, the trial court issued an order granting 
a motion to stay arbitration, thus giving rise to the appeal. 
VI. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Property Rights Ombudsman Act, U.C.A. § 13-43-101 et seq? 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case8 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Fred, Laura and Bret Selman ("the Selmans") seek review of 
the Court of Appeals decision dated April 16, 2009. The matter was submitted to the 
Court of Appeals for review of the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated December 
21, 2007 and Order dated January 15, 2008 holding that the underlying dispute should not 
be submitted to arbitration under the Ombudsman's Act and ordering that arbitration 
under the Act be stayed.9 
6
 U.C.A. §78B-ll-129(l)(b). 
7
 Addendum C. 
8
 Citations to the record on appeal will be designated by "RA" followed by the last 
three digits of the trial case number, then followed by the page number(s) assigned by the 
court clerk. For example, the citation "RA436:83" refers to the designated record on 
appeal for case 070100436, page 83. 
9
 RA436:493-504; Addendum B-l and B-2. 
3 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Fred, Laura and Bret Selman are principals of Harold 
Selman, Inc. (collectively, the "Selmans"). Harold Selman, Inc. engages in a variety of 
farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits. Harold Selman, Inc. owns certain real 
property located in the mountain valleys east of the small town of Mantua, Utah (the 
"Property"). The Property is bisected by the border between Box Elder and Cache 
Counties. 
This lawsuit formally began on April 30, 2007, when the Plaintiffs filed suit 
against Box Elder County to stop Box Elder County's road construction activities on a 
remote trail located on the Property. The Selmans' Complaint asserted several 
independent claims, including: 
• Violation of the Agriculture Protection Area Act U.C.A. § 17-41-101 
et seq.; 
• Violation of the National Environmental Protection Act; and 
• Violation of a Utah State Department of Agriculture and Food 
conservation easement. 
The Selmans further sought injunctive relief to stop Box Elder County's construction 
activities.10 
On May 11, 2007, the trial court entered a Temporary Restraining Order 




reinstallation -.U a gale on the Pruprr* which Box Elder Counp h;uI 'HIM >\ ci ' i»'""' 
T.R.O. remains in force today.11 
' . . , . . - ' >i iinans filed a second suit against Box Elder County based on 
the saint* fad pa'tcrn bml i i IIMK> additional i auses ol action, including: 
• Violation of the County / ana use 
Act, U.L'.A. § 17-26a-101^j^.; 
• Trespass; and 
• uemnation,.12 
The Selmans and Box Elder Coinih htt i iipulah d l< ilir ". oiisolidalion of these twn 
actions against. Box Elder County.13 
In order to stop Cache County from,,, unilaterally beginning road, construction 
i •- * • i< O-.;;.H, ;iiv ^clinaiis filed suit against 
Cache County on June 2A, 2001 asserting ciai^ * 
IL Inverse condemnation; 
III Violation of the County Land Use, Development, and Management 
Act, I J C.A. § 17-26a-10i •  • 
IV Violation of the Sensitive Areas Overlay /one Hi i^iacim n \ '.n he 
County Code § HASMOetseq.; 





VI. Violation of N.RPA; 
VII. Violation of the conservation easement.14 
On June 7, 2007, prior to the Counties filing their answers, the Selmans filed a 
request for arbitration of the dispute with the Property Rights Ombudsman's Office (the 
"Ombudsman's Office") pursuant to U.C.A. § 13-43-204.15 On or about July 18, 2007, 
the Ombudsman's Office formally accepted the Selmans' arbitration request and later 
designated retired Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael Zimmerman as the arbitrator.16 
C. Disposition of the Case at the Trial Court 
On July 25, 2007, Box Elder County answered the Selmans' complaint and 
asserted a counterclaim to quiet title.17 On this same date, Box Elder County filed a 
motion to bifurcate the Selmans' claims from the County's claim to quiet title. Box Elder 
County also asked the Court to stay arbitration with the Ombudman's office.18 On July 
25, 2007, Cache County filed a matching answer and motion in its case.19 









argument on December 13, 2007.20 On I V a i n b n ,.N) "Of!? ihr tii.il ., uiui issued a 
Memorandum Decision bifurcating the case and granting Box Elder ( uiinh i nioin 11 ii • 
stay arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office,21 In deciding the issue, the trial court 
icdsoning and the earlier memorandum decision granting Cache 
County's moiiuu to .tnv ailuimiioii " \non le i HMMII n» Mm Nt ln I «>i 11 if \-" s motion was 
entered Tanu*^ •-\ 2008/ ; 
^ Proceedings before the Utah Court of Appeals 
.
 lt<L of Apptut w ith the trial court on January 25, 
2008.24 TheSclmaiisUmeU ' ^ ^ . • * .. this 
same date, the Selmans timely submitted a Request for Transcript to the First Di^f * 
Court Clerk for Box Elder County.2'' 
As pari nil linn: appellate pm- ''<»iliinn. nn AiiiMisl l Y M i « , the Court of Appeals 
issued an order granting leave to the Ofi i t r of the Pro)M • ri y R i >; 11 f s O11 buds111,111 (m» 1111 11 
amicus curiae brief in support of t lv \ : ?^ position argued by the Selmans. 
i •»i \c\\ i.. . nc })ai ties and the o i i KC of the Property Rights Ombudsman was 
2 0 R A 4 3 6 : 1 3 5 - ^ -»l 200; 204-215; 321-342; 343-359. 
21
 R A 4 ^ K^ i-> inJsii!! it ? 
22
 RA434: 5 (v Addendum B-3. 
2
 !•* • • ! - - ^ - J i i d u i i i I"! 1 . 
2
' k , \436:502-504. 
2
 a \ 4 M - - .-
7 
submitted to the Court of Appeals during the time period June 2008 through November 
2008. 
The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from the parties on March 26, 2009. 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on April 16, 2009. In its decision, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court.26 
E. Proceedings before the Utah Supreme Court 
The Selmans filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari on June 15, 2009. Box 
Elder County filed its opposition to the petition on August 12, 2009. This Court issued an 
order granting the petition on October 1, 2009.27 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS28 
As mentioned above, the Selmans engage in a variety of farming, ranching, and 
other agricultural pursuits in Box Elder County and Cache County. Harold Selman, Inc. 
owns certain real property located in the mountain valleys east of Mantua, Utah (the 
"Property"). The Property is bisected by the border between Box Elder County and 
Cache County. The Property is designated by both Counties as an Agriculture Protection 
Area under U.C.A. § 17-41-101 et seq. and is also subject to a conservation easement 
26Addendum A-l. 
27
 Addendum A-2. 
28
 See generally RA436:10-33; 37-38. 
8 
recorded by the Utah State Department of Agriculture and Food c: i i Ii u: le 30, 2006. 
The portion of the Property at issue has historically been used as summer grazing 
pasture f< •; \\w :^ miu^ \i\ L *»n >CK What is essentially a livestock trail traverses part of 
llir | :•» •"> li" iih'.l in U'lli I1" >• I'liln ,iii,l ( ji'ln ! 'nimhr, I lie trail is known vari<»u>iv 
as "Rocky Dugway Road," the "Three Mile Road ' m ihr \i {< IV^' *li^rrm.Wfci ihe 
"Road"), in :* current condition, the Road is steep, rugged, and impassible by most 
automobiles. 
• - • • ..i . Me ^enaans 
acquired die Tiopeii), ohovv uo public or private recorded easement * 
roadway, or any other reservation indicating a public interest m die Road. I rum the time 
of tl le oi igii lal land grant of the Property in the late 1800fs to the present, there has been 
no legal action adjudicating .in\ li.iil mi flu piopcih h In" \n\hh\ l"\l ilhu I "aifiet '*nml\ 
nor Box Elder County or any other governmental entity have ever taken action to 
condemn the Road or otherwise acquire public access rights to the Property, The Selmans 
1 lip - e alw a.)' s i i mil itaii led tl mt tl le Road, as it passes through the Property, as a private road 
located on private ground. Accordingly the Road Lis I wn "iileil lot Led ,ind Mj-ncd .is 
private. 
Notwithstaiun.-iLL i.ie-Nc lads, in Spring 2007, both Box Elder County and Cache 
Coi it it> passed i ssoh ltioi is claii r lii lg tl :ie R oad as a p I ibli : it oa :1 1 1 le Selmans opposed the 
claims and plans outlined in the Counties' 2007 resolutions 1 in Ihemn »tc llir Si liiiu 
9 
were shocked when they discovered in April 2007 that Box Elder County had started road 
construction activities on the Road, as it passed through the Property, without providing 
them prior notice.29 
As discussed previously, the Selman's filed suit against both Box Elder County 
and Cache County to stop the construction activities on the Road where it passes through 
the Selmans' Property. As a result of these actions, a Temporary Restraining Order was 
entered in the Box Elder County case which stopped construction activities. That T.R.O. 
is still in effect today.30 
On June 7, 2007, the Selmans filed a request with the Ombudsman's Office, 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 13-43-204, for arbitration of their dispute with the Counties. On or 
about July 18, 2007, the Ombudsman's Office formally accepted the Selmans1 arbitration 
request and later designated retired Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael Zimmerman as 
the arbitrator. 
The Ombudsman's Office was created to provide landowners and governmental 
entities with a more expeditious and economical means of resolving takings disputes. 
The Ombudsman's Act specifically directs the Ombudsman's Office to appoint attorneys 




within the Ombudsman ' s Office.31 "Takings and emui . * ; ' ! 
Ombudsman*s Ao >>• me.in the provisions of the federal and state const i tut ions, the case 
law interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provis ions that <vaj m\ oi\ e 
Loiisliiutinii.il issiii's ansiiiL" 11 MM lIn: use or ownership of real property; or, (b) require a 
governmenta l unit to compensa te a rr a 1 f t iopnl\ n \un i Im ,i Diisiiluiinn.il IJKIM;.' m it.) 
p rov ide for relocation assistance to those persons w h o are displaced by the use of eminent 
domain. 3 2 
Upoi 1 tl le i e q;t lest of a pit opei ty - misaiMiia, -;... has a statutory 
m a n d a t e to arbitrate or media te takings of emine . J* »• s * •-
proper ty owners and governmental entities.33 Under the O m b u d s m a n ' s Act, if arbitration 
mediation is requested by a private party and arranged by the O m b u d s m a n ' s Office, the 
i!<n ci'iiiiiii ill i iifih iiiuil 'u ml iiiiisi paiiinp.iio "as il ihc IIMIUM W ere ordered to mediat ion 
or arbi trat ion by a court ."3 4 
Despi te the statutory mandate to arbitrate these disputes, the Count ies moved the 
ti ial cc i in: 1 1 :) stay th 5 a 1 t iti atioi 1 w itl 1 the Ombudsman's office. The trial court granted 
BoxElder County's motion and hasmdnrd thai nmliaiioM n( M^* dispute , pur u HI" l" the 
VC \ 13-43-201(2); Addendu 1 C 
L ' 
• "U.L .A ?} 13-43-204(1); Addendw.iC. 
• . * • udendum 
Ombudsman's Act and through the Ombudsman's Office, be stayed until Box Elder 
County's quiet title action is decided.35 
The Selmans filed their Notice of Appeal in January 2008.36 Briefs were submitted 
to the Court of Appeals during summer and fall of 2008.37 On August 15, 2008, the Court 
of Appeals issued an order granting leave to the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the legal position argued by the 
Selmans. 
The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from the parties on March 26, 2009. 
On April 16, 2009, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in which it affirmed the order 
of the trial court. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that: 
• The ownership of the property at the center of the dispute is only 
peripherally related to the takings claim; 
• That the question of ownership of the property does not fall under 
the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman's Office; and 
• That the parties should fully litigate the ownership question before 
arbitrating with the Ombudsman.38 
IX. 
35





 Harold Selrnan, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009) f l 11, 
12 (Addendum A-1). 
12 
SuMM\ir (wnw \ K ( ; n M i ' T ,ri 
First Argument 
The statutory scheme of the Ombudsman ' s Act grants the Ombudsman ' s Office 
specific authority to use ADR tools, including arbitration, to resolve all issues related to 
takii igs claii i is ii icl.ud.ii lg the tl 1.1 eshold elei 1 lei it of ownership. ' I he Ombudsman ' s off ice 
is qi lalified to resolve takii igs issi les. ii i,el.i iciii i.g tl le elei 1 i.ei it of 01 * n lei si lip 
Second Argument 
\ n o v H v narrow interpretation of the Ombudsman's \ d unTiirK denies the 
:i -*! • n...a:.. • |)Kjuake.% h,v v*i. n a m - r e q u i r i n g 
them to mcui htigaiiuii COM^> a*. ' : cr-.t \ . . « . : . . - : - . . 
T1-. Act mandates that government entities shall participate 11. *\^& 
proceedings with the Oi nbudsman ' s Office. Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice by 
pailk'ipatmjj in in MI hiiului ' .uh ln l ion vulli lhr |l *i 1 il' mlsinaii1'. O l l i u 1 
Third Argument 
A. restricted, interpretation of the Ombudsman ' s Act is contrary to public policies in 
I, Itali and throughout the naliun which support arbitration as a time- and cost-effective 
manner* of resol\ ii lg dispi ites In j : 1 ijj,ii:i|:;i, , ,,i\ ...ngs dispi ites a. 1 \ a> fi :»i 1 1 tl i.e Oi 1 lbi icisi 1 lai I ' S 
Office, courts fail to give effect to the legislative intent of the Ombudsman ' s Act and 





The questions presented by this appeal are matters of first impression for this 
Court. To date, this Court has never interpreted the Property Rights Ombudsman Act, 
U.C.A. § 13-43-101 et seq. Furthermore, because the State of Utah pioneered the 
concept of a property rights ombudsman, these questions are matters of first impression in 
the nation. As such, the Supreme Court has an obligation to provide all interested parties 
with guidance regarding the interpretation and application of the Act.39 
Unfortunately, in this instance, the Courts below have interpreted the language of 
the Act in a manner which is more narrow than the Act intended. The earlier decisions in 
this matter restrict the Act in a manner which weakens the Act and renders it useless. 
A. The Ombudsman's Act granted the Ombudsman's Office specific 
authority to use ADR to resolve takings issues, including the questions of ownership. 
The Ombudsman's Act outlines general duties of the Ombudman's Office as 
follows: 
(1) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall 
(a) develop and maintain expertise in and 
understanding of takings, eminent 
domain, and land use law; 
39Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46(a)(4). 
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* * * 
(d) advise real property owners who have a 
legitimate potential or actual takings 
claim against a state or local government 
entity or have questions about takings, 
eminent domain, and land use law; 
(e) identify state or local government actions 
that have potential takings implications 
and, if appropriate, advise those state or 
local government entities aboi it those 
implications; and 
(f) provide information to pn\ ate citizens, civic 
groups, government entities, and other 
interested parties about takings, eminent 
domain, and land use tow and their rights and 
responsibilities under the takings, eminent 
domain, or land use law s through s em mars a 11J 
publications, and by other appropriate means.41' 
utory mandate, the Ombudsman's Office is directed to appoint 
attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to 
positions within the Ombudsman's Office.41 
Ii i additioi 1 to it : orei •< *i ' \i duties, tl le I -egislati ire ga\ e tl le Oi i: ibi idsi nai I'S Office a 
specific mandate to use ADR to resolve disputes between private property owners and 
government entities win. h !m olve takings or eminent domain issues when such 




assistance is requested by the private property owner and is otherwise appropriate.42 If 
the request falls within the statutory guidelines and is otherwise appropriate, the Act 
grants the Ombudsman's Office no discretion. In these instances, the Ombudsman's 
Office "shall" arrange for mediation or arbitration between the parties.43 
Once a request for arbitration has been made to and accepted by the Ombudsman's 
Office, the government entity is obligated by statute to participate in the arbitration or 
mediation: 
If arbitration or mediation is requested by a private property 
owner under this section, Section 57-12-14 or 78-34-21, and 
arranged by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, 
the government entity or condemning entity shall participate 
in the mediation or arbitration as if the matter were ordered 
to mediation or arbitration by a court44 
Matters which are subject to ADR with the Ombudsman's Office include disputes 
that: 
(1) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real 
property; or 
(2) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner 
for a constitutional taking.45 
The directions and definitions of the Ombudsman's Act are phrased in broad, inclusive 
42




 U.C.A. § 13-43-204(2); Addendum C. 
45
 U.C.A. § 13-43-102(2); Addendum C. 
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language, e.g. "that involve takings or eminent domain issues," "matters that involve 
constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property." 
Despite the broad reach of the language of the Act, the Court of Appeals has 
concluded that the Ombudsman's Office is somehow unable to address the element of 
"property ownership" in its ADR efforts.46 As a rationale for its opinion the Court of 
Appeals reasoned that "ownership of property" is only "peripherally related to a takings 
claim" and thus not appropriate for arbitration with Ombudsman's Office.47 
This holding is problematic because the question of ownership is not "peripheral" 
to takings litigation. Rather, ownership of property is at the heart of all takings disputes. 
Ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings claim.48 The 
"ownership" element of a takings claim is never a foregone conclusion and is often at the 
center of takings litigation in the State of Utah.49 Similarly, New York State appellate 
courts hold that an inquiry into an owner's title is necessary in any analysis of a takings 
46Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County 208 P.3d 535, 538 (Utah App. 2009). 
41Id. 
4%See e.g.View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 111 P.3d 697, 704-
705 (Utah 2005); Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1996); Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097-1098 (Utah 1995); Colman 
v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). 
49See e.g. Smith v. Price Development Co., 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005) regarding 
whether a private party or the State have the ownership interest in a punitive damage 
award. 
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claim. In Washington State, trial courts have an "obligation to try questions of title" in 
takings actions.51 In holding that the question of ownership should not be part of 
arbitration proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office, the Court of Appeals has ignored 
the fact that "ownership" is an essential element of all takings issues which the Utah State 
Legislature has assigned to the Ombudsman's Office for mediation and arbitration under 
the Ombudsman's Act. 
There is no reason that the Ombudsman's Office cannot arbitrate the ownership 
element of a takings claim. The Ombudsman's Act does not prohibit such action. Rather, 
to carry out its statutory mandate, the Ombudsman's Act directs the Ombudsman's Office 
to appoint attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land 
use law to positions within the Ombudsman's Office.52 Furthermore, the Ombudsman's 
Act specifically allows the Ombudsman's Office to appoint qualified arbitrators from 
outside the office to decide the dispute. Arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office is not a 
lawless proceeding. Arbitrators are required to apply the relevant statutes, case law, 
regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the arbitration and in 
determining the award.53 In this case, Michael Zimmerman, a retired supreme court 
]Kim v. City of New York 659 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (N.Y. 1997). 
State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845, 849 (WA 1981). 
- U.C.A. § 13-43-201(2); Addendum C. 
;
 U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(c) and (d); Addendum C. 
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justice, was scheduled to arbitrate the parties' dispute. Certainly, such arbitrators are 
qualified to consider the evidence and render an opinion on ownership, as well as the 
other elements of a takings claim. 
Finally, arbitration of ownership issues with the Ombudsman's Office is not the 
end of the road. The Ombudsman's Act allows that any party may submit the arbitration 
decision or any discrete issue from that decision to the district court for de novo review.54 
Of course, such a review could include the question of ownership. 
B. An overly-narrow interpretation of the Ombudsman's Act unfairly 
denies the Selmans their statutory right to arbitration, A more reasonable 
application of the statute will not prejudice Box Elder County. 
The Ombudsman's Act is easily applicable in the instant case. As evidenced by 
the pleadings filed at the trial court, the dispute between the Selmans and Box Elder 
County raises questions of takings and eminent domain law because the matter involves 
constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of the Selmans' Property. Further, 
the causes of action may require Box Elder County to compensate the Selmans for a 
constitutional taking of the Property.55 
On June 7, 2007, the Selmans filed a request with the Ombudsman's Office for 
arbitration of their dispute with Box Elder County. After finding the Selmans' request for 
arbitration was appropriate, on or about July 18, 2007, the Ombudsman's Office formally 
54
 U.C.A. § 13-43-201(3)(i); Addendum C. 
55
 RA436:010-033; RA518:003-017. 
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accepted the Selmans' request and later designated an arbitrator for the case as required by 
statute.56 The actions of the Ombudsman's Office in accepting the request and arranging 
for arbitration, simply tracked the procedure outlined in the Ombudsman's Act.57 
There is no doubt that the Selmans' case fits the statutory requirements of the Act. 
Furthermore, the Ombudsman's Office properly accepted the Selmans' request and made 
arrangements for arbitration. Where these elements have been met, the 
Ombudsman's Act is clear that Box Elder County "shalYm participate in arbitration as if 
the matter were ordered to mediation or arbitration by a court.59 
In restricting ADR proceedings with Ombudsman's Office, the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals have effectively deprived the Selmans of their statutory right to arbitrate 
this dispute. 
The Legislature's intent in establishing arbitration and mediation procedures under 
the Ombudsman's Act was to grant private land owners a right to attempt to resolve 
constitutional takings disputes through ADR, thus avoiding the undue expenditure of time 
and money associated with civil litigation. Private property owners can be severely 
56
 Addendum D-l; Addendum D-2. 
57
 U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1); (3); Addendum C. 
58
 Where a statute employs the word "shall," there is no discretion: "shall" . . . (b) 
[is] used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory <it shall be 
unlawful to carry firearmsx Merriam-Webster's Dictionary Online (Nov. 16, 
2009)(available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall). 
59
 U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1); (3); Addendum C. 
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prejudiced when forced into litigation with government entities which have much greater 
litigation resources at their disposal. By making participation in ADR through the 
Ombudsman's Office mandatory for all governmental entities involved in takings 
disputes, the Act attempts to level that playing field. 
The Selmans have a statutory right to submit this controversy to arbitration with 
the Ombudsman's Office. The Selmans have a right to expect that Box Elder County will 
participate in the arbitration of issues accepted by the Ombudsman's office. By 
participating in arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office, the Selmans could resolve this 
dispute without expending the time or money which will be required by protracted 
litigation. If Box Elder County is able to deny the Selmans their statutory right to resolve 
this matter in a less expensive and more expeditious manner, the Selmans will have been 
unfairly prejudiced. Unfortunately, in this instance, the County has circumvented the 
purpose of the Ombudsman Act. With arbitration stayed, the Selmans have no choice but 
to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation at the trial court to resolve the 
matter. 
While Utah appellate courts have not addressed this specific issue, the Texas Court 
of Appeals has enforced a statutory right to arbitrate constitutional takings claims. The 
case of In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App. 2007) 
involved an annexation dispute between the appellant, Spiritas, and the town of Little 
Elm. In such disputes, the Texas Local Government Code provided, a private landowner 
21 
the right to request that the municipality arbitrate the dispute. Accordingly, Spiritas 
requested that Little Elm arbitrate the annexation dispute. Little Elm, however, attempted 
to dodge the statute by ruling on the annexation issue before participating in the 
mandatory arbitration. 
Spiritas eventually sought relief with the Texas Court of Appeals, which held: 
Section 43.052(1), which the legislature enacted 
in 1999, states that a landowner may elect 
arbitration after it has met with no success on its 
petition that a municipality include an area 
proposed to be annexed within the three-year 
annexation plan. [Citations omitted.] Once that 
occurs, the landowner and the municipality shall 
proceed with arbitration as specified by section 
43.052(1) Accordingly, a private 
landowner has a statutorily-created right to 
arbitrate a dispute under section 43.052(1) 
regarding whether its land should be included 
in a municipality's three-year annexation 
plan, and, in accordance with that right may 
maintain an action to compel arbitration 
under section 43.052(1) without the necessity of 
a quo warranto proceeding. 
(Emphasis added).60 
Similarly, in this case, the Utah State Legislature has created a statutory right in 
landowners to arbitrate takings disputes with government entities. If the civil action at 
the district court proceeds prior to arbitration, the Selmans will be deprived of their 
statutory right to arbitrate this dispute. As with the Spiritas case, arbitration after the 
In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.App. 2007). 
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matter is resolved by the trial court would be meaningless. The issues will be moot, and 
the expenses of time and money will have already been incurred. This Court should 
follow the holding in Spiritas and not allow Box Elder County to deprive the Selmans of 
their statutory arbitration rights. 
In contrast to the prejudice the Selmans will incur if forced to litigate this matter 
prior to arbitration, Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice if it is required to proceed 
with mandatory arbitration. Arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office is not binding. If 
either party is unhappy with the results of the arbitration, that party may proceed to 
litigate the matter, denovo. 
In sum, staying arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office deprives the Selmans of 
their statutory right to mandatory arbitration with Box Elder County and causes the 
Selmans to suffer unfair prejudice. Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice by 
participating in the statutory mediation. For these reasons, the decision and order of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
C. Denying parties their right to arbitration with the Ombudsman's 
Office violates strong public policy supporting ADR and effectively strips the 
Ombudsman's Office of its statutory powers and duties. 
The Utah State Legislature has expressed its support for arbitration by adopting a 
detailed statutory scheme to govern arbitration in the state.61 Indeed the Legislature's 
enactment of the Ombudsman's Act, with its detailed and mandatory ADR provisions, 
61
 U.C.A. §78B-11-101 etseq. 
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reflects the Legislature's recognition of and support for arbitration as an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
Such endorsement of arbitration is relatively universal throughout all states. This 
support is expressed in statutory arbitration provisions as well as case law. As one 
example, the California Supreme Court expressed its support of arbitration as follows: 
Title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as enacted and 
periodically amended by the Legislature, represents a 
comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration 
in this state... .Through this detailed statutory scheme, the 
Legislature has expressed a 'strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of 
dispute resolution.' . . . Consequently, courts will "'indulge 
every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.'" . . . 6 2 
This strong support for arbitration is prevalent in the case law of many other states, as 
well.63 
The language of the Ombudsman's Act reflects Utah's public policy in embracing 
arbitration as a time- and cost-effective manner of resolving disputes. Unfortunately, the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with that public policy and Utah case law, as 
well. Utah appellate courts have voiced strong support for arbitration as a dispute 
resolution mechanism, explaining: 
62
 Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase 832 P.2d 899, 902 3 CAL.4th 1 (Cal. 1992) 
(numerous internal citations omitted for readability). 
63
 See e.g. Brooks v. Cigna Property and Casualty Companies, 700 N.E.2d 1052, 
299 IU.App.3d 68 (111. 1998); Wyndham v. Haines, 503 A.2d 719, 305 Md. 269 (Md. 
1986); Matter of the Arbitration Between the State Insurance Fund and State of New 
York, 212 A.D.2d 98 628 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.A.D. 1995). 
24 
In Utah, the law favors arbitration, and as such, there is a strong 
presumption against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration. See 
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, \ 12, 114 P.3d 580; Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. 
ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3, f 24, 40 P.3d 599. 'Consequently, a "waiver 
of the right to arbitrate must be intentional," and may be inferred "only if 
the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended 
to disregard its right to arbitrate."' Baker, 2005 UT 32 at f 12, 114 P.3d 580 
(quoting Central Fla Invs., 2002 UT 3 at f 24, 40 P.3d 599).64 
In light of the strong public support for arbitration, the holding of the Court of 
Appeals which dictates that the parties must "litigate first—arbitrate later" is seriously out-
of-step with Utah case law, Utah statutes, and the prevailing sentiments in courts and 
legislatures nationwide. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals also runs contrary to Utah case law which 
has long recognized that courts may not "reach out and usurp powers which belong to 
another independent and co-ordinate branch of the state government."65 
In this instance, the Selmans properly referred the dispute to the Ombudsman's 
Office. After submission, the Ombudsman's Office reviewed the matter and determined it 
fell within the duties and authority granted to its office by the Ombudsman's Act. Then, 
pursuant to statute, the Ombudsman's Office proceeded to arrange for arbitration of the 
dispute under the statute. As the Ombudsman's Office was in the midst of carrying out 
these statutory duties, the trial court reached out and pulled the dispute away from the 
Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc., 122 P.3d 654, 534 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (Utah App. 2005). 
65
 Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 173 P. 556, 52 Utah 210 (Utah 
1918). 
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Ombudsman's Office. Such action ignores the longstanding legal principal that Utah 
courts have authority to interpret, construe, declare, and apply the provisions of a statute, 
but may not interfere with action within the authority of an administrative office.66 In 
essence, the decision of the Court of Appeals allows Utah trial courts to circumvent the 
powers and activities of the Ombudsman's Office. This holding allows trial courts to 
wrongfully usurp powers belonging to another independent and coordinate branch of 
government. Such a decision is in error. 
Should the opinion of the Court of Appeals be allowed to stand, it will open a path 
by which all parties previously subject to proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office can 
avoid their statutory obligation to participate in those proceedings. Should the analysis of 
the Court of Appeals go uncorrected, any party that so wishes will be able to escape 
proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office by simply raising the ownership element 
inherent in all takings issues, and cite to the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this 
matter. That argument will become an effective bar to proceedings with the 
Ombudsman's Office for anyone who wishes to invoke that authority. This narrow 
interpretation of the statute would eviscerate the legislative intent of the Ombudsman's 
Act and strip the Ombudsman's Office of its authority to bring disputing parties to the 
mediation table or to engage the parties in arbitration proceedings. 
In light of the strong public support for arbitration, the County's position of 
66
 State v. Sopher, 71 P. 482 25 Utah 318 (Utah 1903). 
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'litigate first-arbitrate later" is seriously out-of-step with prevailing sentiments in courts 
and legislatures nationwide. Likewise, the Court's order, which allows Box Elder County 
to sidestep the statutory arbitration requirements, is in direct opposition to strong public 
policy nationwide favoring arbitration. For these reasons, the decision and order of the 
trial court should be reversed. 
XL 
CONCLUSION 
In an era of diminishing judicial resources, courts should interpret ADR statutes in 
a reasonable manner which allows them to fulfill the mission envisioned by the 
Legislature. To do otherwise, runs contrary to Utah public policy to promote and support 
arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution procedures. The Court should not 
improperly limit authority which belongs to another independent and co-ordinate branch 
of the state government. The Court should interpret the Act in a manner which does not 
cripple Ombudsman's Office in its attempts to resolve takings disputes between private 
citizens and the public entities. The Court should interepret the Act in a manner which 
protects the Selmans' statutory right to arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office. For 
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
^1 Plaintiffs Fred, Laura, and Bret Selman are principals of 
Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively the Selmans), which engages in 
a variety of farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits 
on property the Selmans own, situated on the border between Box 
Elder and Cache Counties (the Property). Box Elder County 
attempted to build a road on a livestock trail that crossed the 
property. The Selmans sued and subsequently filed a request for 
arbitration of their dispute with the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman). 
counterclaim in district court to 
The district court bifurcated the 
arbitration pending resolution of 
question before us is whether the 
permissible under the Ombudsman's 
Ombudsman Act), see Utah Code Ann. 
2008). We affirm. 
Box Elder County filed a 
quiet title in the property, 
claims and stayed the 
the quiet title action. The 
stay of arbitration is 
enabling statutes (the 
§§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp. 
discovery and deadlines on the Selmans' claims until the quiet 
title claim is decided. The district court granted Box Elder 
County's motion, bifurcating the case and staying arbitration. 
The Selmans appeal that decision pursuant to the Utah Uniform 
Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (2008) 
(allowing parties to appeal "an order granting a motion to stay 
arbitration"). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%5 We are asked to consider whether the district court erred in 
bifurcating the claims and staying arbitration of the dispute. 
This is an issue of first impression. Because we conclude that 
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we 
review the district court's decision for correctness. See 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic 
Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, ^ 13, 200 P.3d 643. 
ANALYSIS 
%S "In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the 
Legislature's intent. We do so by first evaluating the best 
evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language of the 
statute itself. We give the words of a statute their plain, 
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning." Wasatch 
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 13, 179 P.3d 768 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully 
consider the statutory language at issue. 
f7 The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of the 
Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-101 to -206 
(Supp. 2008). Among other things, the Ombudsman is authorized to 
mediate or arbitrate disputes between property owners and 
gove rnment ent i t i e s: 
If requested by the private property owner 
and otherwise appropriate, the , . . 
Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or 
arrange arbitration for, disputes between 
private property owners and government 
entities that involve: 
(a) takings or eminent domain issues; 
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 
7 8B, Chapter 6, Part 5, Eminent Domain; or 
(c) disputes about relocation assistance 
under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act. 
Id. § 13-43-204(1). 
20080229-CA 3 
Selmans and the action is one for inverse condemnation, trespass, 
or both, or it does not and the entire dispute most likely 
evaporates.2 
Ull Accordingly, we conclude that some issues peripherally 
related to a takings claim are not appropriate for arbitration by 
the Ombudsman; the ownership of the property in dispute is one 
such issue. Further, the district court clearly retains 
jurisdiction over any matters not before the Ombudsman. Indeed, 
11
 [t]he trial court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil 
and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(l) (2008). 
CONCLUSION 
Kl2 The quiet title action in this case does not fall under the 
statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman; that is, it is not a 
takings or eminent domain issue. Accordingly, we affirm the 
district court's ruling bifurcating the claims and staying 
arbitration pending the outcome of the quiet title claim. 
£%L*& / . ^AJ^UAJ^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Hi3 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
CarolynvB. McHugh, JudgeCv 
2. We note that if the action is for trespass, it does not fall 
within the scope of the Ombudsman Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-
43-201 (1) (Supp. 2008) . 
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This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on June 15, 2009. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue. 
"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
district court's construction of the scope of the 
arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act." 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
For The Court: 
Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
ADDENDUM B-1 
Prepared an<l submitted by: 
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No. 8827 
CHR1STENSEN A JENSEN, PC. 
15 West Sooth Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472 
Stephen R. Hadfield, Utah Bar No. 5707 
BOX OLDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
01 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (435) 734-3329 
Facsimile: (435)734-3374 
N. George Daines, Utah Bar No. 0803 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
199 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 755-1S60 
Facsimile: (435)753-4002 
Attorneys for Defendanis/Counterclainumis 
fN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC. a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SBLMAN. LAURA 
SELMAN. and BRET SELMAN. 
Plaintiffs .inJ Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
vs. 
_BOX_ ELDERLCOUNTY .ijiod\^ornoriiie^ 
Case No.: 070100436 (consolidated) 
Judge Ben H. Had field 
ORDER GRANTING BOX ELDER 
COUNTY'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
AND STAY 
and politic ot the State of Utah. 
Defendant and Counlerdaimanl. 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC. a Utah 
Corporation: FKfc'D SJbLMAN. LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants. i 
vs. 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
fhe Court considered defendant and counterclaimant BON Thler Count) \ Motion to 
Bifuicate and Stay, the supporting and opposing memoranda submitted thereon (including «i 
round of supplemental memoranda), and the arguments oJ counsel at a hearing held on the 
motion, and issued a detailed Memorandum Decision on December 21. 2007 Based upon that 
decision, the Court hereby ORDERS that Box Elder County's Motion to Bifiucnte and Stay is 
G R A N T E D i\i\d plaintiffs' and counterclaim defendants' Motion lo Rccon^idci August 7. 2U07 
Order lo Bifurcate and Stay is DENIED Accordingly 
I Box Elder County's counterclaim to quiet title is hereby bifurcated Irom the 
plaintifls and counterclaim defendants* claims pursuant to Ut,jh Rule of Civil Pre;* eilure 4?(b). 
1 Box Eldei ( otinl) s countcicldim to i|inei title shall be tried (o^ethn with Cat ho 
County's counterclaim to quiet title before the plaintiffs' and counterclaims defendants claims 
arc litigated; 
3. Any discovery or deadlines associated with the plaintiffs' and counterclaim 
defendants' claims are stayed until Box Elder County's and Cache County's quiet title 
counterclaims are decided, and 
4. Any mediation or arbitration mandated by the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman is hereby stayed until after the counties* quiet* title counierclajnis have been 
determined, at which tune the issue may be raised with this Court 
DATED this _/V_ day of January, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
~r3-k M 
Judge Ben H. J-luclficl4 
Utah First District 
APPROVED AS TO FORM this _^L day ol January. 200S 
BEARNSON & PECK. L C. 
Shci 
Brandon J Baxter 
Attorneys Jen Plawti/Js and 
Counte'rclaim Dejenclcmts 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify lhal on ihis 4th day ofJanuary, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING BOX ELDER COUNTY'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
AND STAY to be served via first class, postage prepaid U.S. mail upon the following: 
Shaun L. Peck 
Brandon J. Baxter 
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C. 
74 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney.') for Petitioners, Plaintiffs, and 
Counterclaim Defendants 




FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
vs. 1 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 1 
Defendant and 1 
Counterclaimant. 1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 070100436 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant and counterclaimant 
Box Elder County's (hereinafter the "County") Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. In preparation of its 
decision, the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support, Plaintiffs' 
Response in Opposition, Defendant's Reply in Further Support, Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support, each 
1 
document submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. Also, 
a hearing was held in this matter on December 13, 2007. Furthermore, on August 7, 2007, Judge 
Gordon J. Low rendered a Memorandum Decision in a substantially similar proceeding in Cache 
County (Case No. 070101434) granting Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. The 
Cache County and Box Elder County matters have now been consolidated into the present case. 
Under Rule 42(b), a court may "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice^]... 
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third party claim, or any separate 
issue or of any number of claims,... counterclaims ... or issues." The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding bifurcation and consolidation 
requests under rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," See, e.g., Coleman v. Dillman, 624 
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1981) (bifurcation under rule 42 may be accomplished for the convenience 
and at the discretion of the trial court); Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 325 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah 1958) 
(absent prejudice to a litigant, the trial court has discretion to consolidate matters for trial). 
In seeking bifurcation and a stay, the County argues that their counterclaim to quiet title 
should be tried prior to litigation and/or arbitration on Plaintiffs' claims. The County argues that 
there is a threshold question as to ownership of the disputed road which should be resolved first 
in order to further convenience, avoid prejudice and the expense of litigating unnecessary claims, 
and efficiently resolve the instant matter. Plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants (hereinafter the 
"Selmans") challenge the County's road resolution on various grounds and contend it constitutes 
a taking, thus (arguably) requiring the County's participation in arbitration arranged by the Office 
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(2). 
However, the County argues that bifurcation should nonetheless be granted because if the road 
belongs to the County, then the Selmans' claims fail; conversely, the County concedes that if the 
Selmans' are determined to be the rightful owners, then a taking cannot occur without payment 
of just compensation. Finally, the County argues that the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman's requirement that the County submit to arbitration should be stayed by this Court 
until a determination has been made on the threshold issue of ownership. Accordingly, the 
County seeks the Court to find that the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low is the "law 
of the case" and that it should control the Court's decision as to Box Elder County. 
2 
In response, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation and staying the arbitration is contrary to 
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43, and fails to make the matter more convenient or efficient. 
Plaintiffs argue that given the statutory mandate, regarding arbitration, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
43-204(2), the court should deny the requested stay. Plaintiffs claim that the Court should give 
deference to the Legislature and the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in allowing the 
matter to be first heard in arbitration. In response, the County argues that the statute does not 
prohibit judicial authority to stay such proceedings, noting that the arbitration provided for under 
the Act is subject to de novo review, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(3)(I). See also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-3-4 ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all maters civil and criminal, and 
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Accordingly, the County 
seeks a stay of arbitration until after determination of ownership. 
Plaintiffs also assert that bifurcation would be unfair and prejudicial to the Selmans and 
that the issues are not clearly separable, as argued by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue 
that arbitration, not bifurcation of complicated matters, is the most cost-efficient manner by 
which the parties could resolve the matter. Plaintiffs also cite to the holding of Walker Drug Co., 
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) and assert, similarly, that bifurcation in the 
instant matter would be unfair. However, the County properly distinguishes Walker Drug 
wherein the issue of damages was tried prior to a determination of liability (known as "reverse 
bifurcation"). In the instant matter, the Court finds that an action to quiet title would be an 
appropriate issue for bifurcation (clearly not "reverse bifurcation") and within the Court's 
discretion to so order. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
"any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties [emphasis added]." Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum Decision 
rendered by Judge Low, as it adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties, can be revised by the Court under Rule 54(b) and notwithstanding the 
"law of the case" doctrine cited by Defendant. 
3 
After reviewing the pleadings and the parties' arguments presented at the December 13, 
2007 hearing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs' analysis that pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court has 
the authority to revise the Memorandum Decision rendered by Judge Low on August 7,2007; 
however, the Court finds no reason to revise the Decision. The rationale set forth in Judge Low's 
August 7,2007 Decision corresponds with this Court's view of the bifurcation issue. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that the Memorandum Decision entered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007, will not 
be revised and will govern this consolidated matter, Case No. 070100436, and apply to Box Elder 
County. 
The Court also finds that the threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road should 
be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further convenience and an efficient resolution to this 
matter. Furthermore, the Court finds that bifurcation should be granted because regardless of who 
actually owns the property, an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the parties to 
negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally, with respect to the Property Rights • 
Ombudsman Act, it appears that the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Therefore, the Court 
will order a stay, but reserves for future adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights 
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may be raised after the threshold issue of 
ownership is determined. 
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on August 7,2007, 
and as supported by the facts and governing law, Defendant and counterclaimant Box Elder 
County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay is granted. Also, implicit in this Memorandum Decision, 
the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider August 7, 2007 Order to Bifurcate and Stay. 
Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this QO day of December, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ben H. Hadfield \P?:.> - • ,"'' fi 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE- • ^ J? 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
'7 \s^~ 
I hereby certify that on the ^ ' day of December, 2007, I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of Selman 
vs. B.E. County and Cache County, case number 070100436, as follows: 
Barton H. Kunz II 
Attorney At Law 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
N. George Daines 
Cache County Attorney 
199 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Stephen R. Hadfield 
Box Elder County Attorney 
09 West Forest Street, Suite 310 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Shaun L. Peck 
Brandon J. Baxter 
Attorneys At Law 
74 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
ADDENDUM B-3 
In the First Judicial District Court 
In and for Cache County, State of U 
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA 
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN, 
PIaintiff(s), 
vs. 
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM 
Case Number: 070101434^1 
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate 
and Stay filed on July 17,2007. The County requests to bifurcate the proceedings, litigate the issue with 
respect to the County's claim to quiet title, and stay any further proceedings relative to further claims made 
by the Plaintiffs. After review of the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that 
judicial economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that the County's counterclaim should 
be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims made by the Plaintiffs which would 
be better addressed separately. Additionally, it does not appear to be the kind of claim which the State 
Office of Property Rights Ombudsmen was created to address in the first place. The Court does have 
jurisdiction to control this litigation despite the reference to the State Office of Property Rights and 
therefore, this Memorandum Decision will serve as notice that the proposed Order Bifurcating and Staying 
Claims filed with the motion has been adopted by this Court and signed and entered this 7th day of August, 
2007. 
Dated this 7th day of August, 2007 
Gordon JCLow, District Court Judge 
First District Court 
O P AUG 07 2007 
• 1 -
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070101434 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail BRANDON J BAXTER 
Attorney PLA 
74 W 100 N 
POB 675 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
Mail N GEORGE DAINES 
Attorney DEF 
199 N MAIN 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Mail BARTON H KUNZ II 
Attorney DEF 
15 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE STE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail SHAUN L PECK 
Attorney PLA 
74 W 100 N 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Dated t h i s IS day of •oC2r 
ourt Clerk 
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ADDENDUM C 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TJTXE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT 
§ 13-43-101. Title 
This chapter is known as the "Property Rights Ombudsman Act/ 
§ 13-43-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Constitutional taking" or "taking" means a governmental action resulting in a tak-
ing of real property that requires compensation to the owner of the property under: 
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; or 
(b) Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22. 
(2) 'Takings and eminent domain law" means the provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions, the case law interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provi-
sions that: 
(a) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property; 
(b) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner for a constitu-
tional taking; or 
(c) provide for relocation assistance to those persons who are displaced by the use of 
eminent domain. 
§ 13-43-201. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman 
(1) There is created an Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in the Department of 
Commerce. 
(2) The executive director of the Department of Commerce, with the concurrence of the 
Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board created in Section 13-43-202, shall appoint 
attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to fill 
legal positions within the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. 
(3) A person appointed under this section is an exempt employee. 
(4) An attorney appointed under this section is an at-will employee who may be termi-
nated without cause by: 
(a) the executive director of the Department of Commerce; or 
(b) an action of the land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board. 
§ 13-43-202, Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board — Appointment — Com-
pensation - Duties 
(1) There is created the Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board, within the Office 
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, consisting of the following seven members: 
(a) one individual representing special service districts, nominated by the Utah Asso-
ciation of Special Districts; 
(b) one individual representing municipal government, nominated by the Utah League 
of Cities and Towns; 
(c) one individual representing county government, nominated by the Utah Association 
of Counties; 
(d) one individual representing the residential construction industry, nominated by the 
Utah Home Builders Association; 
(e) one individual representing the real estate industry, nominated by the Utah Associa-
tion of Realtors; 
(f) one individual representing the land development community, jointly nominated by 
the Utah Association of Realtors and the Home Builders Association of Utah; and 
(g) one individual who: 
(i) is a citizen with experience in land use issues; 
(ii) does not hold public office; and 
(iii) is not currently employed, nor has been employed in the previous twelve 
months, by any of the entities or industries listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f). 
(2) After receiving nominations, the governor shall appoint members to the board. 
(3) The term of office of each member is four years, except that the governor shall ap-
point three of the members of the board to an initial two-year term. 
(4) Each mid-term vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as 
an appointment under Subsections (1) and (2). 
(5) (a) Board members shall elect a chair from their number and establish rules for the 
organization and operation of the board. 
(b) Five members of the board constitute a quorum for the conduct of the board's busi-
ness. 
(c) The affirmative vote of five members is required to constitute the decision of the 
board on any matter. 
(6) (a) No member may receive compensation or benefits for the member's service on the 
board. 
(b) (i) A member who is not a government officer or employee may be reimbursed for 
reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates 
established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-J07. 
(ii) A member who is a government officer or employee and who does not receive 
expenses from the member's agency may be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in 
the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(c) A member may decline to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in the 
performance of the member's official duties. 
(d) A member need not give a bond for the performance of official duties. 
(7) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall provide staff to the board. 
(8) The board shall: 
(a) receive reports from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman that are re-
quested by the board; 
(b) establish rules of conduct and performance for the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman; 
(c) receive donations or contributions from any source for the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman's benefit; 
(d) subject to any restriction placed on a donation or contribution received under Sub-
section (8)(c), authorize the expenditure of donations or contributions for the Office of the 
Property Rights Ombudsman's benefit; 
(e) receive budget recommendations from the Office of the Property Rights Ombuds-
man; and 
(f) revise budget recommendations received under Subsection (8)(e). 
(9) The board shall maintain a resource list of qualified arbitrators and mediators who 
may be appointed under Section 13-43-204 and qualified persons who may be appointed to 
render advisory opinions under Section 13-43-205. 
§ 13-43-203. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman - Duties 
(1) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall: 
(a) develop and maintain expertise in and understanding of takings, eminent domain, 
and land use law; 
(b) assist state agencies and local governments in developing the guidelines required 
by Title 63L, Chapter 4, Constitutional Taking Issues; 
(c) at the request of a state agency or local government, assist the state agency or local 
government, in analyzing actions with potential takings imphcations or other land use is-
sues; 
(d) advise real property owners who: 
(i) have a legitimate potential or actual takings claim against a state or local govern 
ment entity or have questions about takings, eminent domain, and land use law; or 
(ii) own a parcel of property that is landlocked, as to the owner's rights and options 
with respect to obtaining access to a public street; 
(e) identify state or local government actions that have potential takings implications 
and, jf appropriate, advise those state or local government entities about those implications-
and * r * 
(i) provide information to private citizens, civic groups, government entities and other 
interested parries about takings, eminent domain, and land use law and their rights and re 
sponsibilities under the takings, eminent domain, or land use laws through seminars and 
publications, and by other appropriate means. 
(2) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not represent private property 
owners, state agencies, or local governments in court or in adjudicative proceedings under 
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Adininistrative Procedures Act 
(3) No member of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman nor a neutral third 
party rendering an advisory opinion under Section 13-43-205 or 13-43-206, may be com-
pelled to testify in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any review media-
tion, or arbitration by, or arranged through, the office. ' 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), evidence of a review by the Office of the 
Property Rights Ombudsman and the opinions, writings, findings, and determinations of the 
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman are not admissible as evidence in a judicial ac-
tion, 
(b) Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to: 
(i) actions brought under authority of Title 78A, Chapter 8, Small Claims Courts; 
(ii) a judicial confirmation or review of the arbitration itself as authorized in Title 
78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; 
(iii) actions for de novo review of an arbitration award or issue brought under the an 
thority of Subsection 13-43-204(3)(a)(i); or 
(iv) advisory opinions provided for in Sections 13-43-205 and 13-43-206. 
§ 13-43-204. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman -Arbitration or mediation of 
takings or eminent domain disputes 
(1) If requested by the private property owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the 
Property Rights Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes 
between private property owners and government entities that involve: 
(a) takings or eminent domain issues; 
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78B, Chapter 6. Part 5, Eminent Domain; or 
(c) disputes about relocation assistance under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation 
Assistance Act. 
(2) If arbitration or mediation is requested by a private property owner under this sec-
tion, Section 57-12-14 or 78B-6-522, and arranged by the OfiBce of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman, the government entity or condemning entity shall participate in the mediation 
or arbitration as if the matter were ordered to mediation or arbitration by a court 
(3) (a) ® 1° conducting or arranging for arbitration under Subsection (1), the Office of 
the Property Rights Ombudsman shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 78B, 
Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
(ii) In applying Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, the arbitrator 
and parties shall treat the matter as if: 
(A) it were ordered to arbitration by a court; and 
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman or other arbitrator chosen as 
provided for in this section was appointed as arbitrator by the court 
(iii) For the purpose of an arbitration conducted under this section, if the dispute to 
be arbitrated is not already the subject of legal action, the district court having jurisdiction 
over the county where the private property involved in the dispute is located is the court re-
ferred to in Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
(iv) An arbitration award under this chapter may not be vacated under the provisions 
of Subsection 78B-11-124(1 )(e) because of the lack of an arbitration agreement between the 
parties. 
(b) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall issue a written statement de-
clining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator when, in the opinion of the Office of the Prop-
erty Rights Ombudsman: 
(i) the issues are not ripe for review; 
(ii) assuming the alleged facts are true, no cause of action exists under United States 
or Utah law; 
(iii) all issues raised are beyond the scope of the Office of the Property Rights Om-
budsman's statutory duty to review; or 
(iv) the arbitration is otherwise not appropriate. 
(c) (i) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall appoint another person to 
arbitrate a dispute when: 
(A) either party objects to the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman serving as 
the arbitrator and agrees to pay for the services of another arbitrator; 
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman declines to arbitrate the dispute 
for a reason other than those stated in Subsection (3)(b) and one or both parties are willing 
to pay for the services of another arbitrator; or 
^ (C) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman determines that it is appropriate 
to appoint another person to arbitrate the dispute with no charge to the parties for the ser-
vices of the appointed arbitrator. 
(ii) In appointing another person to arbitrate a dispute, the Office of the Property 
Rights Ombudsman shall appoint an arbitrator who is agreeable to: 
(A) both parties; or 
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman and the party paying for the ar-
bitrator. 
(iii) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may, on its own initiative or 
upon agreement of both parties, appoint a panel of arbitrators to conduct the arbitration. 
(iv) The Department of Commerce may pay an arbitrator per diem and reimburse ex-
penses incurred in the performance of the arbitrator's duties at the rates established by the 
Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-J06and 63A-3-J07. 
(d) In arbitrating a dispute, the arbitrator shall apply the relevant statutes, case law, 
regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the arbitration and in de-
termining the award. 
(e) The property owner and government entity may agree in advance of arbitration that 
the arbitration is binding and that no de novo review may occur. 
^ (f) Arbitration by or through the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not nec-
essary before bringing legal action to adjudicate any claim. 
J< (g) The lack of arbitration by or through the OfGce of the Property Rights Ombudsman 
does not constitute, and may not be interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing legal action. 
(h) Arbitration under this section is not subject to Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, or Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 2, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act. 
(i) Within 30 days after an arbitrator issues a final award, and except as provided in 
Subsection (3)(e), any party may submit the award, or any issue upon which the award is 
based, to the district court for de novo review. 
(4) The filing with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman of a request for media-
tion or arbitration of a constitutional taking issue does not stay any county or municipal land 
use decision, including the decision of a board of adjustment 
(5) Members of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not be compelled to 
testiiy in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any review, mediation, or arbi-
tration by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman. 
§ 13-43-205- Advisory opinion 
At any time before a final decision on a land use application by a local appeal authority 
under Section l0-9a-708 or ]7-27a-708, a local government or a potentially aggrieved per-
son may, in accordance with Section 13-43-206, request a written advisory opinion from a 
neutral third party to determine compliance with: 
(1) Sections 10-9a-507 through 10-9a-511; 
(2) Sections 17-27a-506lhrougi 17-27a-510\ and 
(3) Title 11, Chapter 36, Impact Fees Act 
§ 13-43-206. Advisory opinion — Process 
(1) A request for an advisory opinion under Section 13-43-205 shall be: 
(a) filed with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman; and 
(b) accompanied by a filing fee of $ 150. 
(2) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may establish policies providing for 
partial fee waivers for a person who is financially unable to pay the entire fee. 
(3) A person requesting an advisory opinion need not exhaust administrative remedies, 
including remedies described under Section 10-9a-801 or 17-27a-801, before requesting an 
advisory opinion. 
(4) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall: 
(a) deliver notice of the request to opposing parties indicated in the request; 
(b) inquire of all parties if there are other necessary parties to the dispute; and 
(c) deliver notice to all necessary parties. 
(5) If a governmental entity is an opposing party, the Office of the Property Rights Om-
budsman shall deliver the request in the manner provided for in Section 63G-7-401. 
(6) (a) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall promptly determine if the 
parties can agree to a neutral third party to issue an advisory opinion. 
(b) If no agreement can be reached within four business days after notice is delivered 
pursuant to Subsections (4) and (5), the OfQce of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall ap-
point a neutral third party to issue an advisory opinion. 
(7) All parties that are the subject of the request for advisory opinion shall: 
(a) share equally in the cost of the advisory opinion; and 
(b) provide financial assurance for payment that the neutral third parry requires. 
(8) The neutral third party shall comply with the provisions of Section 78B-11 -109 and 
shall promptly: ' 
(a) seek a response from all necessary parries to the issues raised in the request for ad-
visory opinion; 
(b) investigate and consider all responses; and 
(c) issue a written advisory opinion within 15 business days after the appointment of 
the neutral third party under Subsection (6)(b), unless: 
(i) the parries agree to extend the deadline; or 
(ii) the neutral third party determines that the matter is complex and requires addi-
tional time to render an opinion, which may not exceed 30 calendar days. 
(9) An advisory opinion shall include a statement of the facts and law supporting the 
opinion's conclusions. 
(10) (a) Copies of any advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Property Rights Om-
budsman shall be delivered as soon as practicable to all necessary parties. 
(b) A copy of the advisory opinion shall be delivered to the government entity in the 
manner provided for in Section 63G-7-401. 
(11) An advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not 
binding on any party to, nor admissible as evidence in, a dispute involving land use law ex-
cept as provided in Subsection (12). 
(12) (a) If the same issue that is the subject of an advisory opinion is listed as a cause of 
action in litigation, and that cause of action is litigated on the same facts and circumstances 
and is resolved consistent with the advisory opinion, the substantially prevailing party on 
that cause of action may collect reasonable attorney fees and court costs pertaining to the 
development of that cause of action from the date of the delivery of the advisory opinion to 
the date of the court's resolution. 
(b) Nothing in this Subsection (12) is intended to create any new cause of action under 
land use law. 
(13) Unless filed by the local government, a request for an advisory opinion under Sec-
tion 13-45-205 does not stay ihe progress of a land use application, or the effect of a land 
use decision. 
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June 7, 2007 
Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman 
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman 
Utah Department of Commerce 
P.O. Box 145610 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5610 
Re: Selmans, Box Elder County, Cache County Private Property Takings Matter 
Dear Brent and Elliot: 
This letter constitutes our clients' request that the Office of the Property Rights 
Ombudsman conduct a mediation regarding certain private property takings issues. 
As you are aware, our office represents Fred and Laura Selman, Bret and Michelle 
Selman, and Harold Selman, Inc. ("the Selmans") regarding several private real property takings 
issues involving Box Elder County and Cache County. As we have discussed, the particular 
takings issue involves resolutions passed by the Counties in April and May which make claim on 
private roads that pass through the Selmans' real property in the mountains on the Box Elder 
County-Cache County border. 
I appreciate the time that you have taken to speak to us and the various county officials 
regarding this issue over the past few weeks. At this time the Selmans formally request that your 
office conduct a mediation regarding the takings issues pursuant UCA § 13-42-204. The parties 
to the mediation should include the Selmans, Box Elder County, and Cache County. 
It is my understanding that upon a request by a private property owner it is mandatory for 
your office conduct such a mediation. UCA § 13-42-204(1). It is my further understanding that 
it is mandatory for the counties to participate in such mediation arranged for by your office as if it 
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were ordered by the Court. UCA § 13-42-204(2). If you believe my interpretation of the 
mandatory nature of this mediation is in error, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, if 
your office intends to decline this request for mediation on statutory or other grounds, also 
contact me immediately. 
As further background regarding the nature of the dispute, I have attached here for your 
reference, pleadings filed by the Selmans in First District Court against Box Elder County and 
Cache County. I have also attached a copy of an administrative appeal that has been filed in 
Cache County. 
I would ask that you contact Cache County and Box Elder County at your earliest 
convenience to inform them of our mediation request. After you have made contact with these 
government entities, I look forward to setting a day for our mediation. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions or would like to discuss this 
matter further. 
Yours truly, 
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C. 
Brandon J. Baxter 
BJB/ah 
Enclosures 
cc: Fred & Laura Selman (w/out enclosures) 
Bret & Michelle Selman (w/out enclosures) 
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July 25, 2007 
Michael Zimmerman 
Snell &WiImer, LLP 
15 W S Temple, Ste 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1020 
Re: Selman Arbitration. 
Dear Mr. Zimmerman: 
Your ofifice has informed me that you are willing to conduct the arbitration involving the Selmans, Box Elder 
County, and Cache County. We appreciate your willingness to help resolve this situation. Here is the contact 
information for the parties: 
Brandon J. Baxter 
(Attorney for the Selmans) 
Bearnson & Peck 
PO Box 675 
74 W. 100 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
N. George Daines 
Cache County Attorney 
199 No. Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
Stephen R. Hadfield 
Box Elder County Attorney 
9 West Forest St, Ste 310 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
The Ombudsman Office can serve in a supporting role, and assist with scheduling, etc., but we will defer to 
your judgment on how you want the arbitration to proceed. There is no set fee schedule for our office, and the 
parties are aware that there will be a charge for your service. 
For your convenience, I am including a copy of § 13-43-204 of the Utah Code, which authorizes arbitrations 
through the Ombudsman Office. 
Thank you for undertaking this matter, and I look forward to working with you. If you have questions, please 
contact me at (801) 530-6391. 
ELLIOT R.LAWRENCE 
Attorney, Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman 
cc: Brandon J. Baxter, N. George Daines, Stephen R. Hadfield. 
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